In multi-unit demand, uniform-price auctions with synergies there are two opposing economic forces at work: Demand reduction resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have and synergies which promote more aggressive bidding. To capture these synergies a bidder often needs to bid above the standalone value of units. This generates losses when the desired packages do not materialize. This exposure problem, and the possibility that acquiring the desired package will cost more than anticipated, may introduce an additional efficiency distorting force as bidders drop out without obtaining the desired packages. All three forces are present in a highly simplified economic setting that we explore experimentally, comparing sealed-bid with ascending-price (clock) private-value auctions. The behavioral space is very rich and demanding, with demand reduction forces winning out at lower valuations, the competing forces being at peak tension at intermediate valuations, and the synergy effect dominating at higher valuations. The clock auctions provide the opportunity for more refined responses, at intermediate valuations, than the sealed-bid auctions as bidders can make use of rivals drop-out prices to calculate whether or not it pays to try and capture the synergy bonus. If bidders make proper use of this information, and are not affected by the exposure problem, this can produce both higher revenue and economic efficiency than the sealed-bid auctions.
1 Particular attention has been given to the effects of uniform-price auction rules because they are relatively easy to characterize and to implement, and are reasonably close in format to the one employed in the spectrum auctions (see Cramton, 1995) .
Introduction
The recent FCC spectrum auctions have reinvigorated theoretical and empirical research on auctions in efforts to better understand the effects of different auction institutions when individual bidders demand multiple units of a given commodity. One line of research has focused on the performance of auctions with uniform-price rules, where all winning bids pay the same highest rejected bid. 1 It is well known by now that in such auctions, when the marginal value of additional units is non-increasing, bidders have an incentive to reduce demand to exploit the monopsony power they have when demanding multiple units. This strategy may result in winning fewer units, but when it does, it also reduces the price on units earned. (See, for example, Ausubel and Cramton, 1996 and Englebrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1995.) Demand reduction reduces economic efficiency and revenue relative to a full demand revelation. Experimental, and quasi-experimental research confirms that the demand reduction incentives are reasonably transparent and practiced even by relatively naive bidders (Kagel and Levin, in press; List and Lucking-Reily, 2000) . Further, experiments comparing sealed-bid auctions with English-clock auctions reveal that although both auctions have the same normal form game representation, bidding is significantly closer to equilibrium in the clock auction, suggesting there are behavioral elements not fully captured in the theory (Kagel and Levin, in press ).
Auctions which involve synergies, or increasing marginal values for additional units earned, provide additional incentives and generate radically different bidding strategies under uniform-price auction rules. Although the demand reduction incentive still exists, synergies 2 Bykowsky et al. discuss two types of exposure problems that may exist in complex environments with synergies. In our simple environment only the first of these potential problems exists namely exposure to bidding above the stand-alone value and not obtaining the desired package or obtaining it but at higher prices than anticipated. Bidder responsiveness to the exposure problem in this case is akin to loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Package bidding has its own problems. These include the free rider/threshold problem and the computational complexity problem (Charles River Associates and Market Design Inc., 1998).
2 create a powerful opposing force for aggressive bidding in order to acquire desired packages with their super additive value. In sealed-bid uniform-price auctions, that do not permit package bids, strong synergies may dictate submitting bids above the standalone values for individual units in order to increase the probability of winning a multi-unit package. However, this strategy is risky since if a bidder fails to acquire the whole package and wins only parts instead, she is likely to earn negative profits. Thus, in addition to the competing equilibrium incentives, an important "behavioral" force may affect bidding as well: Depending on the size of the potential loss, and risk preferences, bidders may refrain from such aggressive bidding in order to avoid exposure to such losses, despite the benefits of doing so (Bykowsky et al., 1995; Ausubel et al., 1997; Rothkopf et al., 1998) . This avoidance has been referred to as the "exposure problem," a serious concern in some quarters at least, in designing auctions that do not permit package bids. 2 The present paper reports the results of an experiment in a highly simplified auction environment designed to maintain the essential richness of the economic and behavioral forces present in multi-unit demand auctions with synergies. The simplicity of our design allows for reasonable interpretations of the experimental data, and serves as a benchmark against which to evaluate more complex studies. We compare outcomes of sealed-bid and ascending-bid (Englishclock) uniform-price auctions. Under our design, the net effect of the demand reduction force and the synergy force is that in equilibrium: (1) at lower valuations, the demand reduction force dominates so that bidders shave their bids on marginal units, (2) at the highest valuations the synergy force dominates so that bidders "go for it," bidding high enough to insure winning the items, and (3) at middle valuations the two forces are at peak tension and are counterbalancing each other, with bidding above value (but short of "going for it") in the sealed-bid auctions and "going for it," conditional on rivals' observed drop-out prices, in the clock auctions. The exposure problem works against the synergy effect, being most prominent at middle valuations when bidding above standalone values but short of going for it, and when valuations are such that going for it does not insure earning a positive profit.
Under our experimental design a human subject demanding two units of a commodity competes against different numbers of rivals demanding a single unit of the commodity in a uniform-price auction. The role of single-unit buyers is played by computers whose bids are equal to their private values (a dominant strategy for single-unit buyers in these auctions). 3 The standalone values for both items are the same for the human bidder, v h , but earning both units generates three times the standalone value (3v h ). With independent private values drawn from a uniform distribution and with supply of two units, the equilibrium predictions for the "large" bidder correspond to the three regions characterized above. Thus, the experimental design is simple enough to yield equilibrium predictions while still maintaining the tension between the demand reduction and synergy forces. The design also abstracts away from the strategic uncertainties inherent in interactions between human bidders (e.g., problems of learning best responses given rivals' out-of-equilibrium bids). Finally, the experimental design allows us to employ a limited number of values for the human bidders without distorting the equilibrium predictions. We exploit this by limiting the number of standalone values in each experimental session to three, with a number of replications at each value, thereby providing bidders with more systematic, and easier to process, feedback in this relatively complicated bidding environment.
The standalone values employed span the strategy space and induce maximum differences in strategic behavior between the sealed-bid and clock auctions, while providing a number of replications at each value against which to evaluate behavior.
We do not expect bidders to be able to calculate and respond precisely to the fine cut off points associated with such a complex auction environment. Thus, we focus attention on the following questions: Are bidders sensitive to the tradeoffs inherent in uniform-price auctions with synergies? Do they behave differently in cases where the demand reduction force dominates compared to cases where the synergy bonus is strong enough to dominate? What role, if any, does the exposure problem play in bidding? What are the nature of deviations from optimal bidding strategies, and are there systematic differences in the patterns of deviations between the two types of auctions studied? Are there public policy implications resulting from any systematic deviations from optimal bidding? There has been some recent experimental work on multi-unit demand auctions with synergies. The work falls roughly into two categories: First, "test bed" experiments designed to explore the effects of different auction rules on outcomes in environments with strong synergies (Banks, Ledyard, and Porter, 1989; Ledyard, Porter, and Rangle, 1997; Plott, 1997) . Most of these experiments take place in environments that are substantially more complicated than ours, for which a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction can implement global efficiency (maximizing the value of an assignment) with competitive equilibrium prices. (For details, see the references 4 Krishna and Rosenthal extend their analysis to auctions in which there is more than one bidder with increasing returns. The Krishna-Rosenthal model is (arguably) closer, in some respects, to the U. S. spectrum auctions than our experimental design. Their model does not, however, deal with possible synergies within a given market as ours does. It is these underlying economic and behavioral forces that our experiment is designed to investigate rather than any effort to faithfully replicate any particular spectrum sale design. 5 This result comes about for different reasons in the two models: In our case, bidding the same on both items follows from a dominance argument (see Appendix A). In Krishna and Rosenthal it follows from the assumption of equal numbers of single-unit bidders in each market in conjunction with their focusing on symmetric Nash bidding strategies. 5 cited above.) Second, are experiments designed to explore the feasibility of Vickrey style auctions with package bids (Isaac and James, 2000; Brenner and Morgan, 1997) . We do not address the question of Vickrey style auctions here. Finally, Ausubel et al. (1997) and Morten and Spiller (1996) examine license interdependencies in some of the early FCC spectrum auctions.
The auction model underlying our experiment is similar to one developed in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) to explore simultaneous sealed-bid auctions with synergies. In both cases there is a single bidder demanding two units competing against a number of rivals demanding a single unit. The primary difference between the two models is that in Krishna and Rosenthal the bidder demanding multiple units competes in two separate second-price auctions against n single-unit demand bidders in each market. 4 In other words, in our model the two goods are perfect substitutes and sold together in a single uniform-price auction. In Krishna and Rosenthal the two goods are imperfect substitutes and sold in two separate second price auctions. The net effect is that there is no demand reduction force present in their model as there is in ours. However, in regions of our experimental design where the synergy force dominates the demand reduction force, the two models make remarkably similar predictions: Single-unit bidders always bid their value. When bidding above value, the bidder with increasing returns always bids the same on both units with bids increasing in the valuation drawn.
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Once the valuation is high enough, there is a discontinuous jump in the bid function, so that the bidder with increasing demand "goes for it."
Finally, bids of the multi-unit demand bidder are weakly decreasing with more competition.
Krishna and Rosenthal do not extend their analysis to ascending-bid clock auctions as we do here.
Our experiment yields a number of basic insights: Bidders are always closer to optimal bidding strategies in a clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. Bidders are responsive to the underlying economic forces present in the auction even though there is considerable out-ofequilibrium play. Further, out-of-equilibrium play differs substantially between the two institutions. In the sealed-bid auctions there is a clear tendency for bidders to overbid at low values and underbid at high values. In contrast, in the clock auctions, absent secure, positive expected profits, there is a general reluctance to bid above value when optimality requires it, consistent with the "exposure problem." At least part of this differential sensitivity to the exposure problem in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions results from the obvious ability to stop the bidding and assure a positive profit in the clock auctions. This is indicative of a clear presentation format effect, an outcome observed in other auction settings as well (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987; Levin, Kagel, and Richard, 1996; Kagel and Levin, in press) . As a result, the clock auction fails to improve efficiency relative to the sealed-bid auctions where the theory predicts it should, and the sealed-bid auctions generate uniformly higher revenue.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section I develops the theoretical predictions for both ascending-bid and sealed-bid auctions. The experimental design is outlined in Section II. Results of the experiment are reported in Section III. We close with a brief summary and discussion of our major results.
I. Theoretical Predictions:
We investigate bidding in IPV auctions with (n+1) bidders and m indivisible, identical objects for sale, where n m. Each bidder i (i = 1, ... , n) demands a single unit of the good, placing a value v i on the good. These bidders are indexed by their values so that v 1 v 2 , ..., v n .
Bidder h, the (n+1) th bidder, demands two units of the good, with the value of each unit by itself equal to v h . However, earning two units generates synergies so that the value of winning both units = 2v h + αv h . Bidders' values were independent and identical draws (iid) from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,V] . In what follows we work with m = 2, α =1, as these are the values employed in the experiment, and analyze behavior within the unit interval (V=1).
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For both sealed-bid and clock auctions there are three bidding regions, with distinctly different bidding strategies for the human bidder in each region. These are summarized in Figure   1 . Note, that for regions 1 and 3 outcomes are essentially the same between sealed-bid and clock auctions: demand reduction in region 1 and "go for it" in region 3. However, for the clock auctions, there is more flexibility in executing the optimal strategy in region 1, and the interval for region 3 is smaller. In contrast, outcomes are distinctly different between the two auction formats in region 2. In the sealed-bid auction, optimal bidding requires submitting two equal bids set higher than the value of a single unit, which may result in winning one unit and earning negative profits. In the clock auctions, the multi-unit demand bidder conditions her drop-out price on whether the second highest rival's value, v 2 , is lower or higher than a predetermined cut off value, P * . If P * > v 2, she should "go for it" in an all out effort to win both units. Otherwise, she should 7 Appendix A provides derivations of the equilibrium bidding strategies for the sealed-bid auctions. 8 drop out on both units at P*. As a result, and in contrast to the sealed-bid auctions, bidders should never earn a single unit. Detailed analysis of the auction procedures and outcomes follow.
Sealed-bid auctions:
In the sealed-bid auction, each bidder simultaneously submits sealed bids for each of the units demanded. These are ranked from highest to lowest, with the m highest bids each winning an item and paying a price equal to the m+1 highest bid. 2. For ½ < v h < v(n), v h < b 1 = b 2 < 1. That is, the optimal bidding strategy calls for submitting two equal bids above v h, but not high enough to assure winning both units. Both the size of this interval and how much to bid above v h varies with n, with a wider interval and more aggressive bidding the smaller n is (see, for example, Table 1 below). As our proof in the appendix uses only dominance arguments to yield b 1 = b 2 for this region, these criteria hold for risk aversion as well, although the precise level of the bids would be affected by risk preferences.
3. For v h v(n), b 1 = b 2 1. That is, the optimal bidding strategy is to "go for it," bidding high enough to insure wining both units.
Ascending-bid (Clock) Auctions:
The ascending-bid version of the uniform-price auction (also referred to as a clock auction or an English-clock auction) starts with the price being zero and increasing continuously thereafter. Bidders start out actively bidding on all units demanded, choosing the price to drop out of the bidding. Dropping out is irrevocable so that a bidder can no longer bid on a unit she has dropped out on. This yields distinctly different outcomes than the sealed-bid auctions in this interval. Note that, in contrast to the sealed-bid auction, the bidding rule in this region does not depend on the number of rivals as the information revealed in the second highest computer's dropout price is sufficient to determine the optimal bidding strategy. 12 All three values occurred in each consecutive series of three auctions, but in random sequence. 13 In the clock auctions with n = 3, v 1 is often below $5.10, so there is very little information to be gained about whether or not h's recognize that "going for it" is the optimal strategy in these cases. This problem is reduced substantially with n = 5. Further, rather substantial deviations from the optimal bidding strategy of b 1 = b 2 $7.50 (for example, bidding above $5.10 but below $7.50) frequently incur no penalty in sealed-bid auctions with n = 3, but such deviations are much more likely to be punished with n = 5. 12 three of the four values employed using a block random design.
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Values employed with each set of computer rivals, along with equilibrium predictions for h's bids are reported in Table 1 . The lowest v h , $3.00, calls for complete demand reduction in both auctions, and is employed exclusively with n = 3. (The expected cost of deviating from the optimal strategy with v h = $3.00
and n = 5 is quite small, and involves a rather large opportunity cost in terms of foregone observations at more salient values.) The highest v h, $5.10, requires "going for it," and insures a secure (minimum) profit of 30¢ per auction. It is employed exclusively with n =5 out of cost considerations and the fact that there is little 'bang for the buck' at this value in auctions with n = 3.
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The middle values make different predictions between sealed-bid and clock auctions and were employed with both n = 3 and 5. v h = $4.40: It pays to "go for it" in the sealed-bid auctions (b 1 = b 2 $7.50), regardless of whether n = 3 or 5. The clock auction also calls for bidding above value, with the cutoff point P* 14 Earlier multi-unit demand auctions without synergies demonstrate that this restriction has no effect on bidding strategies (Kagel and Levin, in press ). 13 = $5.70.
Finally, for both intermediate values, if h mistakenly stays beyond max {P*, v 3 }when v 2 > P* the certain loss associated with stopping the auction and winning one unit is greater than the expected loss associated with remaining active and winning both units. Thus in equilibrium or outside equilibrium, h should never win only one unit in the clock auction.
All clock auctions employ a "digital" clock with price increments of $0.01 per second.
Following each computer drop out there was a brief pause of 3 seconds. h's dropping out during a pause counted as dropping at the same price, but later than, the computer's dropout. h could drop out on a single unit by hitting any key other than the number 2 key. The first stroke of the key pad dropped out unit 2. Hitting the number 2 key, or a second key during the pause, permitted h to drop out on both units at the same price.
In the sealed-bid auctions the sequencing required subjects to submit bids on unit 1 followed by unit 2. Any nonnegative bid was accepted for unit 1, with the bid for unit 2 required to be the same or lower than the bid on unit 1. 14 There was no opportunity to submit a single bid for both units combined or a bid contingent on winning only one or winning both units.
In all sessions, instructions were read out loud, with copies for subjects to read as well.
The instructions included examples of how the auctions worked as well as indicating some of the basic strategic considerations inherent in the auctions. For example, the instructions pointed out that the higher h's value, the more valuable the synergy bonus was, hence the greater value of earning two rather than one unit, and that when bidding above v h winning a single unit would 15 In those few cases where end-of-experiment earnings were below $2.00, a token $2.00 payment was provided.
14 necessarily involve losses (see the instructions for full details). Finally, it was emphasized to subjects that "...in thinking about bidding, earning an item is of no intrinsic value. Your sole objective should be to maximize your earnings." Subjects were told that in each auction period the computers would (and did) receive fresh values. At the conclusion of each auction, bids were ranked from highest to lowest and posted along with the corresponding values. Winning bids were identified, prices were posted, profits were calculated, and cash balances were updated. Bidders only observed the outcomes for their own market. Sessions began with three dry runs to familiarize subjects with the auction procedures, followed by thirty-three auctions played for cash.
Bidders were given starting capital balances of $5. Positive profits were added to this and negative profits subtracted from it. End-of-experiment balances were paid in cash. Expected profits were sufficiently high that we did not provide any participation fee.
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Sessions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours.
III. Experimental Results:
This is a relatively complicated experiment both for the subjects and for providing a concise, yet comprehensive, analysis of the results. To help guide the reader, the result's section consists of a series of conclusions along with support for those conclusions. Our focus will be on bidding behavior, with some attention to revenue and efficiency as well. Throughout the analysis we will concentrate on bidding in the last 6 auctions under each v h , when bidders would have become reasonably familiar with the environment (recall, that there were 11 auctions played for 19 Kagel and Levin (in press) show that in a multi-unit demand, uniform-price auction, with flat demand, a clock auction with no feedback on rivals' drop-out prices looks no different from the sealed-bid version of the auction. Further, a sealed-bid auction with the crucial dropout information employed in the clock auction provided by the experimenter, improves performance, but still comes up short compared to a clock auction with rivals' dropout prices announced. Bids being closer to equilibrium/optimal play in clock versus sealed-bid auctions are consistent with results from a large number of auction experiments: single-unit private value auctions (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987) , single-unit common value auctions (Levin, Kagel, and Richard, 1996) , and multi-unit demand, uniform-price auctions without synergies (Kagel and Levin, in press ). 18 Further, it is clear from the experimental manipulations reported in Kagel and Levin (in press ) that it is the clock auction format, in conjunction with the information revealed to h by dropout prices, that is responsible for its superior performance.
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What's missing from Table 2 , and will provide the focus of the detailed analysis that 20 In our experimental design, bids above $7.50 have essentially the same impact of bids of $7.50 and are treated as such. 21 δ i (0, σ δ ) and ζ it (0, σ ζ ) where δ i and ζ it are independent among each other and among themselves. Note, in our experimental design, the use of computer rivals, clearly supports the assumption that the δ i are independent among each other. 16 follows, is the pattern of deviations from equilibrium, which is quite different between the two auction institutions. Support for this conclusion is reported in Table 3 , where we have fit random effect Tobits to the bid data. We employ Tobits as there is a mass point at $7.50, and we truncate all bids greater than $7.50.
Bidding in Sealed-bid auctions:
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An error components specification is employed with the error term ε it = δ i + ζ it , where δ i is a subject-specific error term assumed to be constant between auctions within an experimental session, and ζ it is an auction period error term. Standard assumptions regarding the error terms are employed. For the n = 3 both dummy variables are significant at the 5% level or better, indicating that bids were increasing in v h , as they should be, for both b 1 and b 2 . Further, the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for unit 1 bids is well above the optimal bid when v h = $3.00 and $4.00 (optimal bids of $3.00 and $4.34, respectively), with unit 2 bids showing a similar pattern. While the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for unit 1 bids is $7.50 for v h = $4.40, the upper bound for unit 2 bids falls well short of the optimal bid of $7.50. Finally, for v h = $4.00 the upper bound for unit 2 bids falls short of the lower bound for unit 1 bids. This is indicative of a general failure to follow the requirement that b 1 = b 2 when bidding above value.
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Similar results are reported for the n = 5 case. Both dummy variables are significant at the 5% level or better, indicating that bids were increasing in v h , as they should be, for both b 1 and b 2 .
The lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for unit 1 bids is well above the optimal bid of $4.16 with v h = $4.00, as is the lower bound for unit 2 bids. For v h = $4.40, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for unit 1 bids includes $7.50, but is short of the optimal bid of $7.50 for unit 2 bids. What is different from the n = 3 case is that there is overlap between unit 1 and unit 2 bids in all cases. This is clear from the raw data as well, which shows that conditional on b 1 v h , the relative frequency of b 1 > b 2 has been cut by 50% compared to n =3.
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No doubt these differences result from the fact that bidding less on unit 2 compared to unit 1 (conditional on b 1 > v h ) is more costly with n = 5 than n = 3. 24 Finally, the regression shows that for v h = $5.10, the 25 Other deviations from optimality include winning 0 units and winning 1 unit with negative profits ("going for it" but then reconsidering) with deviations slightly favoring the latter case.
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lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for unit 1 bids is $7.50, and the 95% confidence interval for unit 2 bids includes the optimal bid of $7.50 as well. As such, even though the equilibrium requirement of b 1 b 2 $7.50 is only satisfied 40.6% of the time, bidders win both units 71.9% of the time. The net result is that deviations from optimality in payoff space are substantially smaller than deviations from optimality in the choice space. 26 Support for the statistical significance of these differences is provided buy random effect probits, with subject as the random component. 27 And dropping too soon is within a whisker of the modal response in the fourth case (n = 3 and v h = $4.40).
Bidding in Clock Auctions
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(2) In cases where v h < v 2 P*, where optimality requires "going for it," and necessarily involves bidding above v h , there is a high frequency of winning zero units. The combined frequency of winning zero units and winning 1 unit (which involves "going for it" but then reconsidering when bidding above v h ) is consistently higher than the frequency of winning two units. Further, bidders win two units consistently less often when v 2 v h .
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And the exposure problem is necessarily more extreme when v h < v 2 P* than when v 2 v h . In contrast, the theory predicts no difference in the frequency of winning two units between these two cases.
(3) In cases where v 2 > max(P*, v h ) equilibrium play calls for bidding up to P* and dropping on both units at this point. This necessarily involves bidding above v h , but rarely happens. Rather the modal response in three out of four of these cases is to drop out prior to P*, typically dropping out very close to v h .
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In contrast to bidding at these intermediate valuations ($4.00 and $4.40), bidders have little problem bidding above their valuation for v h = $5.10, when they are assured of a minimum profit of 30¢ by going for it. This response to the exposure problem in the clock auction is in marked contrast to the sealed-bid auction where bidders show no reluctance to bid above v h on both units. This suggests that it is both the fear of losses, in conjunction with the auction format, that is responsible for the greater response to the exposure problem in the clock auction. What is it about the clock auction that accounts for this heightened exposure effect? The clock auction format (with feedback on bidders' drop-out prices) makes it much more transparent to bidders, 28 We should add that in cases where v 2 v h , the saliency of the demand reduction option ("stop the clock and win 1 unit assuring positive profits") is much more pronounced in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions when demand reduction is consistent with optimal bidding (Kagel and Levin, in press ). with standard errors in parentheses and + and ** indicating statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels respectively. The DN5 dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level. 20 compared to sealed-bid auctions, that they are liable to lose money as a consequence of bidding above value (Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1986; Kagel, 1995; Kagel and Levin, in press ). In singleunit private value auctions, and in multi-unit demand auctions without synergies, this heightened awareness of the perils of bidding above one's valuation helps to improve bidder profits and to move play closer to the equilibrium outcome. Here it holds bidders back from achieving maximum profit and generates deviations from the equilibrium outcome.
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One final thing to note in Table 4 is the sharp (and consistent) difference between the frequency of winning two units for n = 3 versus n = 5 when v 2 v n , and when v 2 P* for the region 2 valuations of $4.00 and $4.40. 29 We suspect that this has little to do with the different number of rivals in the two treatments, but is a hysteresis effect brought on by the different behavior patterns rewarded under the remaining valuation in each case: the $3.00 value which calls for complete demand reduction with n = 3 and the $5.10 value which calls for "going for it" with n = 5. This result is summarized in Conclusion 4.
Conclusion 4: There appears to be a strong hysteresis effect in the data, as with resale values of $4.00 and $4.40, the exposure problem is much more severe with n = 3 than with n = 5.
30 Focusing on outcomes (win 2 units) in comparing between auction formats controls for the censoring problem associated with bids in the clock auctions in comparing between auction formats. 31 A third specification introducing an interaction effect between the Dearly and Dclock dummies fails to reduce the log likelihood function by a significant amount. 
Learning and Adjustments Over Time:
The next conclusion takes a closer look at bidding with v h = $5.10. In almost all respects this should be (and is) the valuation for which play is closest to optimal in both auction formats as it only takes a little arithmetic to realize that "going for it" yield a secure, minimum profit of 30¢ per auction. As a result, with repeated exposure to the problem one would expect more subjects to "get it." And they do as the data show a clear learning effect, converging toward optimal play.
Conclusion 5: With v h = $5.10, we observe clear adjustments over time toward optimal play in both sealed-bid and clock auctions. However, winning two units is still more pronounced in the clock auctions.
Support is provided by the random effect probits reported in Table 5 , where we have pooled the data for both clock and sealed-bid auctions for v h = $5.10. The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 in cases where two units were won (as optimal bidding requires) and 0 otherwise. 30 We use the data for all auctions, excluding the dry runs. Model 1 includes a single dummy variable, Dclock = 1 if a clock auction, 0 if sealed bid. The coefficient for the dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that play is closer to the optimal outcome in the clock auctions. Model 2 introduces a second dummy variable, Dearly = 1 for the first 5 auctions, 0 for the last 6, in an effort to identify possible learning/adjustment effects. These are clearly present as indicated by the relatively large, statistically significant negative coefficient value for the Dearly dummy. Further, the introduction of the Dearly dummy has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the Dclock dummy or on its standard error.
31
This is the one case where we observe clear learning/adjustments toward optimal play in the data. Specifications searching for learning/adjustment effects for other valuations reveal considerably more noise in early play (higher variances and less stable coefficient values), as opposed to any clear adjustments toward optimal play.
B. Profits, Efficiency and Revenue
This section examines profits, revenue and efficiency. Bidders' profits provide a measure of success in terms of payoffs, and provide a convenient way of characterizing performance in suggestive of what will be observed in interactive settings. Finally, in reporting revenue and efficiency we provide a benchmark against which future experiments with all human bidders can compare results on these important issues.
Profits:
Conclusion 6: Profits are consistently and significantly less than would have been achieved with optimal bidding in all but one case (v h = $4.00, n = 3, sealed-bid auction) . Profits are consistently higher in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions, but fail to be significantly higher in several cases where the theory predicts that profits will be higher. Table 6 reports profits --actual, predicted and the difference between the two --for both auctions, along with the difference between actual profits in the two auction formats (sealed-bid less clock). At v h = $3.00, bidders earned negative profits averaging -60¢ and -15¢ in the sealedbid and clock auctions respectively. Profits in the sealed-bid auctions were significantly below zero (t = 2.80, p < .01, 2-tailed test), and significantly less than those realized in the clock auctions (t = -1.93, p < .10, 2-tailed test), reflective of the large differences in equilibrium play between the two auctions.
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Recall that under optimal bidding profits are predicted to be the same in both auctions for v h = $3.00.
For n = 3, with v h = $4.00 and $4.40 optimal bidding predicts 20-24% higher profits in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. These higher predicted profits result from the greater flexibility afforded by the information revelation in the clock auctions. These higher profits do not materialize, however, as (i) the exposure problem serves to promote the strong demand reduction found in the clock auctions, which wipes out most of the advantages resulting from information revelation in this case, and (ii) the deviations from equilibrium in the sealed-bid auctions are not so severe as to have disastrous effects on earnings. Even larger percentage differences between profits are predicted with optimal bidding at v h = $4.00 and $4.40 with n = 5.
In contrast to the n = 3 case, these differences are largely realized (at least directionally) as the clock auctions raise an average of 43¢ and 21¢ more per auction at $4.00 and $4.40 respectively (t 33 The differences we do find are aided by the higher predicted profits in the clock auctions. The latter results from sampling variability in terms of the computer values drawn, as optimal bidding yields the same equilibrium outcome in both cases. 24 realized in this case result from (i) the weaker demand reduction effect in the clock auctions with n = 5 (recall Conclusion 4) and (ii) the harsher effects of deviating from optimal bidding in the sealed-bid auctions with n = 5. Finally, the relatively modest differences in bidding with v h = $5.10 do not translate into significant differences in actual earnings between the two auction formats (t = -1.29). Table 7 reports efficiency outcomes. At the $3.00 value actual efficiency is very close to predicted levels in both sealed-bid and clock auctions. This is not surprising in the clock auctions where bidding is relatively close to equilibrium, but is somewhat unexpected in the sealed-bid auctions with its large deviations from equilibrium outcomes. These deviations apparently have minimal impact on efficiency since the overbidding occasionally produces large efficiency gains (relative to the predicted outcome) as a result of the synergy bonus. At the $4.00 value, where the tension between the synergy bonus and the demand reduction effect is strongest, the clock auction is predicted to yield large efficiency gains compared to the sealed-bid auction. However, these gains go almost entirely unrealized as (i) the exposure problem serves to promote demand reduction in the clock auctions, which wipes out most of the efficiency gains predicted, and (ii) deviations from equilibrium bidding in the sealed-bid auctions have essentially no effect relative to predicted efficiency. No doubt this last result is due to the fact that with the synergy bonus 34 Actual efficiency is greater than predicted efficiency in the sealed-bid auctions in these two cases. There is no inconsistency here since predicted efficiency is less than 100%; i.e., predicted efficiency is the value of the two highest units sold (including the synergy bonus) under the Nash equilibrium with incomplete information divided by the value of the two units sold under the full information Nash equilibrium. 25 overbidding occasionally produces large efficiency gains relative to the predicted outcome. 34 Finally, actual efficiency is well below predicted efficiency at higher values in both auction institutions as bidders do not "go for it" often enough to take full advantage of the synergy bonus.
Revenue:
Conclusion 8: Revenue is consistently higher in the sealed-bid auctions, and is significantly higher in four out of six cases. These higher revenues in the sealed-bid auctions do not come at the expense of any significant efficiency losses relative to the clock auctions.
Revenues are reported in Table 8 . Note that revenues are predicted to be substantially higher in the clock auctions with v h = 4.00 as the information revelation in the clock auction at this valuation promotes more aggressive bidding compared to a sealed-bid auction. In contrast, at the $4.40 value the sealed-bid auction is predicted to raise more revenue as bidders should "go for it" all the time, but still condition their actions on rivals' dropout prices in the clock auction. The actual data, however, show uniformly higher revenues in the sealed-bid auction: 4.0% to 18.8% higher revenue with n = 3, 3.0% to 12.7% higher revenue with n = 5 (calculated as a percentage of realized revenue in the clock auctions). Note that these increased revenues do not come at the expense of reduced efficiencies, as Table 7 reports no significant decreases in efficiency in sealedbid compared to clock auctions, and one case with significantly higher efficiency in the sealed-bid auction.
C. Experienced Bidders
This section briefly discusses results from two additional sealed-bid auction sessions using bidders who had participated in one of the sealed-bid or clock auctions reported above. Both of the experienced subject sessions employed n = 3, with valuations of $3.00, $4.00 and $4.40.
Conclusion 9: Experienced subjects in sealed-bid auctions do not perform materially better than inexperienced ones. There are, however, significant differences depending on bidders' past experience: Those with clock experience bid less aggressively at lower valuations compared to those with sealed-bid experience. These differences constitute a direct carryover of the differences observed between auction institutions for inexperienced bidders.
Support for this conclusion is provided in Table 9 , where separate bid functions have been estimated as a function of subjects prior experience -sealed-bid or clock. Random effect Tobits, similar to the ones reported in Table 3 have been estimated in both cases. As in Table 3 Results for those with sealed-bid auction experience are quite similar to those reported for inexperienced bidders in Table 3 . Qualitatively, bids are well above what they should be to maximize profits for v h = $3.00 and $4.00, and bids are too conservative (not "going for it" often enough) with v h = $4.40. Quantitatively, the 95% confidence intervals for unit 1 and unit 2 bids overlap for all three values with those reported for inexperienced bidders in Table 3 . (However, there is some tendency for experienced bidders to bid more aggressively at v h = $4.00 and $4.40.)
In contrast, those with clock experience bid far less aggressively, with the 95% confidence intervals for unit 1 and unit 2 bids (i) uniformly lower, with no overlap, compared to subjects with sealed-bid experience (Table 9) , and (ii) uniformly lower, but with some overlap, compared to inexperienced bidders (recall Table 3 ).
35 t = -3.96, p < .01, 2-tailed test. Average profit per subject serves as the unit of observation. All profit calculations here are based on simulations using actual bids for human bidders in each auction and 500 simulated draws for the computers for each auction. This helps to smooth out the variability inherent in using actual draws for the computer from the auctions, and are employed here because of the relatively small number of subjects involved. 36 In these two sessions we also varied the order of v h values to see if this had any impact on behavior. In one session valuations were rotated in a block random design, as in the inexperienced subject sessions, for 24 auctions, with the session terminating with 8 auctions with v h = $3.00. In the other session valuations were presented in blocks of 8 auctions: 8 auctions with v h = $3.00, followed by 8 auctions with v h = $4.40, followed by 8 auctions with v h = $4.00, and ending with 8 auctions with v h = $3.00. There were no statistically significant, or economically significant, differences between the block random design and the session with values fixed for 8 auctions, indicating the absence of any kind of hysteresis effect on this dimension. It will be interesting to see if this result holds for inexperienced bidders.
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These bid differences result in large differences in profits at the lowest and highest v h values: Substantially higher profits were earned for those with clock experience at v h = $3.00 (0.01¢ per auction) versus those with sealed-bid experience (-0.65¢ per auction). 
C. Comparison to Multi-Unit Demand Auctions Without Synergies
We have conducted an experiment similar to this one with one major difference --the synergy bonus was set to zero (Kagel and Levin, in press) . In this case demand reduction dominates at all valuations, as it does in region 1 here. This section briefly compares the outcomes observed in this earlier experiment with the outcomes in region 1 here (v h = $3.00). For sealed-bid auctions there is a much higher frequency of bidding above value on unit 1 in auctions with synergies (77.8%) than in those without (37.9%).
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Similar differences in the frequency of bidding above value are found with respect to unit 2: 54.5% of all auctions with synergies versus 24.7% without. And there is substantially less demand reduction (defined as bidding more than 5¢ below value) in auctions with synergies (30.1%) versus those without (58.6%).
Of course, neither of these differences is terribly surprising. The introduction of relatively large synergies creates a potent force acting in opposition to the demand reduction forces inherent in uniform-price auctions. As such it is not terribly surprising to find increased deviations from optimal bidding even when the demand reduction forces should dominate.
IV. Summary and Conclusions:
We report results from an experiment comparing sealed-bid and ascending-bid uniformprice auctions where individual bidders demand multiple units and there are synergies between units. We use a simple demand structure: Several single-unit demand bidders and one bidder demanding up to two units. We further simplify the structure by having computers play the dominant strategy that single-unit bidders have of always bidding their value. In spite of its simplicity, the key economic incentives present in uniform-price auctions with synergies are all captured: the synergy effect, which promotes bidding above standalone values; the exposure problem which may deter bidders from pursing this aggressive biding strategy, thereby reducing economic efficiency; and the monopsony power that multi-unit demand bidders can exploit to reduce prices in a uniform-price auction.
The experiment shows that bidding is closer to optimal play in the clock auctions, consistent with evidence from a number of other auction environments (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987; Levin, Kagel, and Richard, 1996; Kagel and Levin, in press ). Further, in most cases bidders behave sensibly, though not optimally: Bidding under the highest valuation, where the optimal play is quite transparent, generates by far the highest levels of optimal play, levels that are comparable to the highest levels reported for subjects in any experimental auction environment.
Demand functions estimated for the sealed-bid auctions are monotonically increasing in bidders'
valuations. In the clock auctions, there is a higher frequency of "going for it" at higher valuations, when multi-unit demand bidders should strive to obtain both units.
Nevertheless, there is much out-of-equilibrium play under both institutions, with the most interesting and dramatic differences occurring at intermediate valuations where the theory requires balancing demand reduction incentives against the synergy bonus, while exposing bidders to possible losses. At these values the exposure problem promotes relatively strong demand reduction in the clock auctions in contrast to optimal bidding which requires that bidders "go for it." In contrast, the exposure problem is barely present in the sealed-bid auctions, with bidders consistently bidding above value on both units. This suggests that it is both the fear of losses, in conjunction with the auction format, that is responsible for the greater response to the exposure problem in the clock auction. The clock auction format (with feedback on bidders drop-out prices) makes it much more transparent to bidders that they are liable to lose money as a consequence of 38 See, for example Naik (1996) who discusses problems small firms had in PCS auctions and Mills (1997) who discusses problems a number of bidders had in the Interactive Video and Data Services (IVDS) auction. 39 The recent Wye River conference sponsored by the FCC/NSF/Stanford was called, and devoted to, "Combinatorial Bidding." Combinatorial, or package, bidding is one possible solution to the exposure problem as bidders can bid aggressively to acquire a package with supper additive value, without the risk of getting just parts of the package at cost that exceeds the value. This demonstrates that the exposure avoidance problem is presumed "alive and well" among more sophisticated bidders. 30 bidding above value (Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1986; Kagel, 1995; Kagel and Levin, in press ).
This heightened awareness of the perils of bidding above ones' valuation helps to improve bidder profits and to move play closer to the equilibrium outcome in single-unit private value auctions and in multi-unit demand auctions without synergies. With synergies it holds bidders back from achieving maximum profit and generates deviations from the equilibrium outcome.
How relevant are these findings of out-of-equilibrium play to "real world" auctions? We argue that for low stakes field settings, or those that for one reason or another, bidders do not employ high-powered consultants (as occurred in at least one U. S. spectrum auction), our observations are directly relevant.
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But what about high-stakes settings with high-powered consultants on all sides, as is typically the case in auctions involving many millions or even billions of dollars? Extrapolating laboratory results in such cases is clearly more problematic and one must be much more careful in assessing the applicability of the results. However, we do know that the exposure problem is a major concern in auctions with synergies. 39 Our experiment demonstrates that it is more prevalent in an ascending price format where the consequences of stopping the auction and winning a limited number of items with positive gains are accentuated by the auction format. It is also clear from "war stories" of colleagues and consultants involved in advising companies that not all advice is good advice, and not all good advice is acted on. Further, "real" auctions are substantially more complicated than the one implemented here, so much so, that it is usually impossible to identify optimal bidding strategies. Thus, the answer to questions of applicability of laboratory results to field settings remains the same here as it does elsewhere: Laboratory economic systems are real economic systems. Thus, behavioral processes identified in the lab are presumed to hold beyond the lab. This, shifts the burden of proof to those who argue that such findings will not generalize to provide a factual basis for their argument in field data.
There are a number of obvious and interesting extensions to the experimental results 
Ascending Clock Auction + Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level, 2 tailed t-test ** Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, 2 tailed t-test 
